How to store API keys
for an AI agent.

What 'per-identity vault' means

The vault is bound to an agent identity. The agent's API key authenticates reads; another agent's key can't read this vault even if both run in the same process. When the agent identity is revoked, its vault entries are destroyed in the same operation.

This differs from a generic secrets manager (AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault) where access is granted by IAM role and the vault outlives the things that use it. Per-identity vaults make orphaned credentials structurally impossible — the credential lifetime is tied to the agent lifetime.

Store a key (one-time, from your dev box)

Pre-load credentials when you set up the agent, not at runtime. The pattern: POST to /v0/vault with a label and the secret value. Labels are how the agent refers to the secret without ever seeing its value in code.

# Store a Stripe restricted key under the label 'stripe-refund'
curl -X POST https://api.loomal.ai/v0/vault \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $LOOMAL_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "label": "stripe-refund",
    "value": "rk_live_..."
  }'

Read a key from the agent (Python)

In the agent, fetch secrets by label. Don't cache in memory longer than necessary; a per-request fetch is typically fine and avoids leaking secrets through long-lived memory.

import os, requests

def get_secret(label: str) -> str:
    res = requests.get(
        f"https://api.loomal.ai/v0/vault/{label}",
        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {os.environ['LOOMAL_API_KEY']}"},
        timeout=5,
    )
    res.raise_for_status()
    return res.json()["value"]

# Use at the moment of the API call, not at process start
stripe_key = get_secret("stripe-refund")

Read from TypeScript

Same endpoint, same pattern. For agents using an MCP-aware framework, skip the wrapper — the model calls vault.get as a typed tool and the value never passes through your code.

async function getSecret(label: string): Promise<string> {
  const res = await fetch(
    `https://api.loomal.ai/v0/vault/${label}`,
    { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${process.env.LOOMAL_API_KEY}` } },
  );
  if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`vault: ${res.status}`);
  return (await res.json()).value as string;
}

Rotation and revocation

Rotate by overwriting the vault entry. The next read returns the new value; no redeploy needed. For TOTP secrets, the same pattern applies — re-enroll on the target service, overwrite the otpauth URL in the vault.

Revocation is where the design pays off. To retire the agent, revoke the identity in the Loomal console. Every vault entry, TOTP secret, and email credential dies in the same operation. No manual cleanup across twelve services.